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I. Introduction
On March 24, 1982, an arbitral tribunal rendered an award of compensa-
tion for the nationalization by the State of Kuwait of the oil concession and
local assets of the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil).' Follow-
ing a certain lack of concord in transnational2 arbitral pronouncements3 and
legal writings on the subject, the Aminoil award could become the source of
a consensus for solutions relating to nationalization and state contracts! The
award was unanimously arrived at by three highly respected international
jurists from industrialized as well as developing countries, on the basis of
proceedings in which both parties fully participated Furthermore, Kuwait
carried out the award without reservation on its due date of July 1, 1982.
The Aminoil tribunal limited itself to carrying out "the function entrusted
to it ' 6 and avoided general or theoretical statements. In this context, the
reasoning in Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's Separate Opinion, which is not a
*The author practices law in New York City. Member of the New York and Geneva
(Switzerland) Bars.
'The award is reproduced in 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982). See Kahn, Contrats d'Etat et Nationalisa-
tion-Les apports de la sentence arbitrale du 24 Mars 1982, 109 J. DROIT INT'L 844 (1982).
Burdeau, Droit International et Contrats d'Etat-La Sentence Aminoil c. Koweit du 24 Mars
1982, 28 ANN. FRANC. DROIT INT'L, at 454 et seq. (1982).
2The terms "transnational arbitration" are used herein to describe arbitration not based on a
treaty. The terms "international commercial arbitration," however, are also usual.
3On the three "Libyan arbitrations," see von Mehren and Kourides, International Arbitra-
tions Between States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 Am. J.
INT'L L. 476 (1981).4Kahn, supra note 1, at 844.
Fatouros noted about default arbitrations that "Such one-sided proceedings are hardly likely
to lead to full investigations of the issues." Fatouros, International Law and the International-
ized Contract, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 134, at 139, note 26.
6Award, para. 2, 21 I.L.M. 976, at 999 (1982).
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dissenting opinion, is most helpful in assessing the meaning of the award. It
is submitted that the Aminoil award is the most significant arbitral contribu-
tion in recent years to the law of state contracts and state responsibility for
these contracts.
In order to put into perspective the main issues decided by the arbitral
tribunal, it appears necessary to review in some detail the main facts and the
arbitration proceedings. Then, an examination will be made of the solutions
given to the questions of the laws governing the arbitration and the merits,
as well as the nature and regime of the concession, the validity and effect of
the takeover, and the stabilization clauses; finally, a brief comment is
presented on the measure of compensation.
The relief sought by each party is reproduced at the beginning of the
award. In summary, Aminoil requested reparation for the termination of its
concession, including lost profits, and the taking of its plant and other assets.
Replacement value was claimed for the physical plant, and actual or market
value was claimed for the other assets. In addition Aminoil sought return of
a portion of its payments to the Kuwaiti government made in accordance
with a 1973 agreement which, the company alleged, had never become
binding. The government, on the other hand, claimed damages allegedly
caused by Aminoil's poor oil-field and operating practices, and sought
payment of capital expenditures which it alleged Aminoil should have
made. The government also sought payment of the increased amounts
Aminoil should allegedly have paid in taxes and royalties by application of a
renegotiation clause in the Concession Agreement. In addition, the govern-
ment alternatively claimed that if the 1973 agreement had never become
binding (as Aminoil claimed), it was entitled to additional payments by
application of a pre-existing gold clause which the 1973 agreement termi-
nated.
II. The Facts
A. THE 1948 CONCESSION AGREEMENT
In 1948, the Ruler of Kuwait 7 and Aminoill concluded a concession
agreement granting to the latter, for sixty years, the right to explore and
exploit oil and natural gas in Kuwait's half-interest in the Kuwait-Saudi
'Kuwait was then in a special treaty relationship with the United Kingdom, whereby the latter
assumed the former's foreign affairs and defense. Consequently, the British government gave
its approval to the Aminoil concession. The said special relationship was terminated by the
Agreement of June 13, 1961 between the two countries. 1961 United Kingdom Treaty Series,
No. I (Cmd. 1409). On November 11, 1962, the ruler promulgated a written constitution.
'Aminoil, a Delaware corporation, was controlled by a group of American individuals and
companies, none of them being a "major" international oil company. In 1970, R. J. Reynolds
Industries, Inc. purchased all the shares of Aminoil.
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Arabia "Neutral Zone." 9 Aminoil's obligations included, in addition to
financial obligations (lump sum and annual royalty payments), drilling as
well as medical and educational commitments, and the obligation to build a
refinery. The 1948 concession agreement gave the Ruler the right to termi-
nate the concession in case of violation by the company of certain of its
obligations. In addition, the agreement contained a "stabilization" clause"°
and an arbitration clause."
B. THE 1961 SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
In 1961, the parties entered into an agreement amending and sup-
plementing the 1948 concession agreement, which was to continue in full
force so far as it was not "inconsistent with or modified by" this new
agreement. 2 Two main factors caused the conclusion of this new agreement.
First, a general pattern in the Middle East of imposing a 50/50 percent
sharing of profits with respect to oil concessions led Kuwait to impose and
apply, since 1955, a fifty percent tax on companies doing business in Kuwait.
Second, Aminoil had difficult operating conditions which justified special
financial arrangements to implement the new tax legislation. The low qual-
ity and production difficulties of Aminoil's crude oil was an important factor
in the financial arrangements between the parties and particularly in their
renegotiation in connection with the "Abu Dhabi formula."' 3 The 1961
supplemental agreement laid emphasis on the increased financial obliga-
tions of Aminoil; it retained the stabilization clause of the 1948 concession
agreement and also contained an additional stabilization clause. 4 Fur-
thermore, Article 9, the "renegotiation clause," included an obligation to
consult which became the basis of all subsequent negotiations between the
parties. Some of these negotiations led to further amendments to the con-
9The Neutral Zone became known as the "Divided Zone" after Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
agreed by treaty of July 7, 1965, to partition it. In 1949, Saudi Arabia granted to Getty Oil
Company a concession on its half-interest in the Zone.
'"Article 17, 21 I.L.M. 976, at 990-91 (1982). See infra note 153.
"Article 18, 21 I.L.M. 976, at 991 (1982). (Ad hoc arbitration with three arbitrators, the
chairman being appointed by the two party-appointed arbitrators or, if they fail to agree, by the
British Political Resident in the Gulf; London being the place of arbitration unless otherwise
agreed between the parties.)
121961 Supplemental Agreement, Article 11. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 991 (1982).
13Aminoil's commercial production had commenced in 1954 and the refinery commenced
operating in 1958. Most of the oil refined by Aminoil in Kuwait was heavy, high-sulphur and
relatively low value fuel oil. A large number of wells and pumps were required to produce the
crude oil, which had also to be separated from salt and water. These special conditions, which
reduced marketability and increased costs, led to complex arrangements contained in a confi-
dential letter accompanying the 1961 Supplemental Agreement.
141961 Supplemental Agreement, Article 7 (g) (introducing a new Article 11(B)), see infra




cession, but others remained unsuccessful and led to the takeover of
Aminoil in 1977.
C. INFLUENCE OF OPEC
Kuwait had been a member of OPEC since its inception in 1960.15 In
accordance with OPEC's successive positions, during the 1960s, the govern-
ment sought to impose on Aminoil increasingly onerous amendments to the
concession; negotiations took place, but no agreement was signed. In
February 1971, the application of OPEC resolutions was the subject of the
"Teheran Agreement" between some Gulf States and several major oil
companies (not including Aminoil) .16 The government made it known that it
wished to apply similar terms to Aminoil. The company agreed to negotiate
while insisting that its special operating conditions required substantial
adjustments. In January 1972, the OPEC countries concluded the "Geneva
I Agreement" with the major oil companies,'7 and in June 1973 the "Geneva
II Agreement" was made between essentially the same parties." In the
meantime, towards the end of 1972, the major oil companies had been
required to enter a "General Agreement" yielding a 25 percent participa-
tion to the state.
D. THE 1973 INTERIM AGREEMENT AND
ITS MODIFICATIONS
After several years of intensive negotiations between the government and
Aminoil, a draft agreement was prepared in July 1973, incorporating (with
some adjustments) most of the recent changes that had occurred in the
relationship between oil companies and host states." The government
"Among the abundant literature concerning the influence of OPEC, see ABDUL AMIR Q.
KUBBAH, OPEC-PAST AND PRESENT, Vienna (1974); MANA SAEED AL-OTAIBA, OPEC AND THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, London (1975).
"'
6The Teheran Agreement (published in 10 PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, No. 8 Supp.,
Feb. 22, 1971) provided for an increase in posted prices and an increase in tax payments to 55
percent, but guaranteed that no change would be made to these conditions through the end of
1975.
"This agreement (published in 11 PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, No. 5, pp. 5-6, Jan. 31,
1972) provided for a further increase (prompted by the weakness of the dollar) of 8.49 percent
in posted prices, together with adjustments to fluctuations of the dollar on the basis of nine
specified currencies.
"This agreement (published in 12 PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, No. 24 Supp., June 11,
1973) further amended the Teheran Agreement, adding two more reference currencies and
providing for the monthly adjustment of posted prices in accordance with currency fluctuations.
"'The tax rate, as well as the rate of compensation of "make-up payments," was revised from
57 to 85 percent; royalties were treated as costs of operation retroactively to 1964; payments
were accelerated; the Teheran, Geneva I and Geneva II Agreements applied to Aminoil "as if
it had been a party thereto"; choice of law and arbitration clauses were also inserted. The draft
agreement provided that "[a]ny future discussion between the government and the company
regarding concession provisions will take into consideration that the company shall not be
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pressed Aminoil to make immediate payments under the draft agreement of
July 1973. Under this draft, however, the signature and coming into effect of
the new agreement was made subject to ratification by the Kuwaiti Parlia-
ment, in accordance with the laws of Kuwait.
Aminoil agreed to send a letter dated December 22, 1973 formalizing its
acceptance to apply the draft agreement "as if the 1973 agreement was
effective ... and the proposed 1974 Income Tax law had come into force."
This letter of December 22, 1973 will be referred to below as the 1973
interim agreement. Aminoil made the payments in accordance with the 1973
interim agreement on a provisional basis and continued to do so until the
takeover, on September 19, 1977.
Aminoil wished to obtain the relative security given by a valid agreement,
but the July 1973 draft agreement was never signed. Its terms (provisionally
applied under the 1973 interim agreement) were modified on three occa-
sions in 1974 by unilateral decisions of the government. These modifications
all tended to increase the payments due by the company? The 1974 income
tax law was never enacted or presented as a bill to the Parliament of Kuwait.
E. ECONOMIC PRESSURE
Aminoil alleged that in December 1971, the then Minister of Finance and
Oil threatened to "shut down" Aminoil's operations in Kuwait if it did not
accept terms similar to that of the Teheran Agreement.21 This threat was not
enforced, but according to the company it remained an underlying factor in
the negotiations with the government from that time onward. Since 1973
approximately, as noted by the arbitral tribunal, "the balance of advantage
in the Gulf region had tilted in favour of governments."22 In October 1973,
OPEC for the first time established new "posted prices," which were 70
percent higher than those set by the companies. These prices did not take
account of the Teheran, Geneva I or Geneva II Agreements. Like the other
companies, Aminoil complied. It was stated by the governments that com-
panies which would not agree had to stop production immediately. 3 It is in
denied a reasonable opportunity of earning a reasonable rate of return (having regard to the
risks involved) on the total capital employed in its business attributable to Kuwait."
0The modifications followed OPEC decisions. These more onerous terms, however, were
more than compensated by the quadrupling of posted prices in 1974, so that Aminoil's profits on
the sales of crude oil and refined products rose from $3.990 million in 1973 to $24.670 million in
1974, $30.637 million in 1975, $40.649 million in 1976, and $51.456 million in 1977 (until
September).2
"Aminoil Memorial, para. 60. A shutdown was the worst possible prospect for the company
as this would have prevented it from operating and exporting, while all its obligations and
liabilities would have continued to run (unlike the case of a nationalization).
22Award, para. 45. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1008 (1982).
23This was notified to Aminoil on October 16, 1973. By letter of November 8, 1973, the
government notified further increases in posted prices, stating that "further adjustments in
these prices will be notified to you from time to time as may be required by the government."
Aminoil Memorial, para. 68 and Exh. 25.
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this climate of "strong economic pressure" and "under constraints ' 24 that
Aminoil agreed to write the letter of December 22, 1973 (the 1973 interim
agreement).
F. PETROLEUM POLICY OF KUWAIT
Apart from Aminoil, two other companies were granted oil concessions in
Kuwait. In 1934, the first and by far the most important concession (extend-
ing over the whole territory of Kuwait) was granted to the Kuwait Oil
Company (KOC), a company owned half by British Petroleum Company
Limited and half by Gulf Oil Corporation. The KOC concession was re-
negotiated in 1951 and, after further modifications consequent upon OPEC
resolutions, including a 60-percent state participation in 1974, the conces-
sion was taken over by the government in 1975 by mutual agreement. 5
Chronologically the third active petroleum concession, granted after
Aminoil's concession, was concluded in 1958 with the Japanese-owned
Arabian Oil Company (AOC) on the off-shore Divided Zone. AOC was
also granted a concession by Saudi Arabia on her sector of the offshore
Divided Zone. AOC's concession still subsists, although the Governments
of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia owned 60 percent of AOC's shares by 1980. In
1969, Kuwait's share of AOC's production was more than twice the produc-
tion of both the Aminoil and Getty operations on the onshore Divided
Zone." According to the government, oil accounted in 1975 for over 98
percent of total government revenues. (Later, income from investment
more than equaled oil revenues.) Proven oil reserves amounted to about
60,000 million barrels, the third largest in the world after Saudi Arabia and
the U.S.S.R. Kuwait was the first member of OPEC to set a ceiling on
production 7
G. THE "ABU DHABI FORMULA"
In November 1974, three Gulf states, members of OPEC, met at Abu
Dhabi and decided to raise the level of royalties immediately to 20 percent
and the income tax rate to 85 percent of posted prices. In December 1974,
these terms were adopted in a decision of OPEC and became known as the
Abu Dhabi formula. This change not only increased the concessionaires'
financial obligations, as was the case with previous decisions, but, according
24Award, para. 41. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1007 (1982).
'The text of the original K.O.C. concession of 1934, the subsequent agreements and the
acquisition agreement of 1975 are reproduced in FISCHER, A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
CONCESSIONS AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS, CONTEMPORARY SERIES, at 133 (1975/76).
26The Government's Memorial, para. 1.33.
27The Government's Memorial, paras. 1.36 and 1.38.
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to the award, "embodied the notion that the revenues left to the Companies
would be predetermined on a fixed (package) basis of 22 cents per barrel
[.. .]-thereby transforming the concessions defacto in service contracts. ' 28
It was thus "possible to foresee a general end to the concessionary re-
gimes. "29
In October 1975, the government advised Aminoil by telex that the Abu
Dhabi terms were to be applied to the company effective November 1,
1974.30 Aminoil replied that the application of such terms would result in a
loss to the company on every barrel produced, and requested negotiations.
H. 1976-77 UNSUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS TO
APPLY THE ABU DHABI FORMULA
From February to April 1976, negotiations took place, but no agreement
was reached and the parties continued to operate under the terms of the
1973 interim agreement as amended in 1974. Aminoil's initial position in the
negotiations, which was to be given great weight by the arbitral tribunal, was
expressed in a written proposal as follows: the company would accept the
application of the Abu Dhabi formula as from October 1, 1975, but with an
adjusted reference price, so that Aminoil could make a "reasonable level of
earnings" (allowing for required capital expenditures) of about 18 million
dollars per year (the government's share being estimated at 202.5 million
dollars).
The government, on the other hand, wanted to recover what it viewed as
"Aminoil's windfall profits" resulting from the explosion of oil prices, and
proposed a fixed annual return of 6 million dollars, which would have been,
as noted by the arbitral tribunal, "a less easy and more precarious position
than with a contract of service.'"'
After a long gap in the negotiations, the government appointed a commit-
tee in March 1977 to complete all pending negotiations with Aminoil within
forty-five days. This second stage of negotiations was again unsuccessful,
and both parties recognized that their positions were irreconcilable." On
28Award, para. 50. 21, I.L.M. 976, at 1009-10(1982). Aminoil urged that the 22¢ represented
the application of the Abu Dhabi terms to companies in which the government had a 60-percent
ownership (participation) interest; and that the correct figure when the Abu Dhabi terms were
applied to companies in which the government had no ownership interest was 54¢. Tables
submitted by the government in its pleadings confirmed this, but the tribunal, although
referring to this fact in a footnote to paragraph 50 of the award, failed to give effect to the
distinction, and therefore computed the government's compensation from the Abu Dhabi
formula on the basis that Aminoil was entitled only to a profit of 22 cents per barrel.29Award, para. 51. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1010 (1982).
3Aminoil Memorial, Exh. 39.31Award, para. 63 and para. (liv). 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1012 (1982).
2By then, "a marked deterioration in the climate of attitude" (Award, para. 67) had been
caused by, on the one hand, the triumph of OPEC and, on the other, the fact that Aminoil was
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June 22, 1977, however, Aminoil presented a totally new written proposal:
the termination of the concession and its replacement by a service contract 3
This would have brought the question of the Abu Dhabi formula into the
issue of the amount of compensation to be paid by the government for the
takeover.
The government did not accept this proposal: while endorsing the princi-
ple of a takeover, it insisted that the retroactive financial claims in relation to
the Abu Dhabi terms be negotiated (thus not allowing Aminoil to keep its
profits since 1975), that compensation be calculated on the basis of net book
value, and that the future contract be more limited. Finally, in a letter of
August 6, 1977, Aminoil advised that it would be prepared to make a cash
payment of 5 million dollars to the government, based on a valuation of its




On September 19, 1977, the government passed decree-law No. 124
"terminating the Agreement between the Kuwait government and Amin-
oil." The decree-law provided that the concession granted to Aminoil "shall
be terminated" (Article 1) and that all property of the company in Kuwait
"shall revert to the State" (Article 2); a compensation committee was to be
set up "to assess the fair compensation due to the company as well as the
company's outstanding obligations" (Article 3).35
accumulating abroad considerable capital sums. The government claimed part of these sums
were ultimately to be refunded under the Abu Dhabi formula. Aminoil's position was ex-
pressed in a written proposal of April 15, 1977 updating its earlier proposal of March 19 (profits
amounting to $18 to 20 million a year, corresponding to 70c a barrel). The government's
position, expressed at a meeting, was that the net return for the company should amount to $4
to 6 million, corresponding to an income tax of 97/2 percent. Aminoil revised its position in a
written proposal of April 24, offering retroactive payments as from November 1, 1974 of over
$37 million and an income tax raised gradually from 85 percent in 1974 to 95 percent in 1978.
The government did not accept, but offered orally a profit in the region of $7.5 million a year
(corresponding to 25c profit a barrel), applying as from January 1, 1975 and entailing a
retroactive payment of about $56 million. Award, paras. (lviii) to (lx). 21 I.L.M. 976, at 997-98
(1982).33Award, para. (Ixii). 21 I.L.M. 976, at 997 (1982). The company would, under this proposal,
manage the technical and administrative operations for a service fee based on oil income; in
addition, the company's assets in Kuwait would be transferred free of charge to the gov-
ernment; all pending financial claims were to be abandoned.
"
4Award, para. (xiv). 21 I.L.M. 976, at 983 (1982). The government favored a three-to-five-
year simple marketing contract or, alternatively, the sale of oil to the company at a discounted
price.
3 The decree-law was published in the MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY, vol. XX, No. 49,
Sept. 26, 1977. The first three articles provided as follows:
"Article 1: The concession granted to the American Independent Oil Company in accord-
ance with the aforementioned Agreement dated 28 June 1948 shall be terminated.
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III. The Arbitration Proceedings
On July 23, 1979, the parties signed an arbitration agreement providing
for ad hoc arbitration in Paris. 6 This was the result of a compromise between
Aminoil, which had instituted arbitration proceedings in London under the
arbitration clause of the 1948 concession agreement, 37 and the government
which was following the compensation procedure set forth in the decree-
law? The government's later decision to arbitrate, instead of defaulting in
the London arbitration, can perhaps be explained by two main factors. First,
the risk of an unfavorable default award by a sole arbitrator which would
have been enforceable, at least in most countries, depending mainly on the
rules governing foreign sovereign immunities. Second, the good relations
existing between Kuwait and the United States, upon which investments in
both countries are based.
Under the 1979 arbitration agreement neither party was considered as
claimant or defendant?9 The parties agreed to limit their claims to monetary
ones,40 and provided for considerable freedom of the arbitral tribunal in
Article 2: All interests, funds, assets, facilities and operations of the Company, including the
refinery and other installations relating to the aforementioned concession, shall revert to the
state.
Article 3: A committee named the Compensation Committee shall be set up by a decision of
the Minister of Oil whose task it will be to assess the fair compensation due to the Company as
well as the Company's outstanding obligations to the State or other parties. It shall decide
what each party owes the other in accordance with this assessment. The State or the
Company shall pay what the Committee decides within one month of being notified of the
Committee's decision."
3 The arbitration clauses of the 1948 concession agreement and the 1973 draft agreement
already provided for ad hoc arbitration. The parties did not choose to refer their dispute to
institutional or "administered" arbitration. Kuwait, however, had ratified the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter "I.C.S.I.D. Convention"],
which became effective for Kuwait as of March 4, 1979.
37Article 18. See supra note 11. Aminoil's position was that the 1973 "draft agreement"
including its arbitration clause had not come into force for lack of signature and ratification;
furthermore, the company did not recognize the compensation procedure instituted by the
decree-law as binding upon itself. Consequently, by letter of December 20, 1977, Aminoil
requested ad hoc arbitration. Aminoil then appointed Sir G. Fitzmaurice as its arbitrator.
38The compensation committee set up by the decree-law invited Aminoil by letter of January
7, 1978, to present its point of view, but the company declined in view of the pending arbitration
it had instituted in London, The government's position, stated in a letter of January 30, 1978,
was that its right to control its natural wealth and reclaim what it had granted was conditioned
only by a commitment to pay compensation, which was provided for in the decree-law and was
proceeding normally.
39Consequently, the parties simultaneously exchanged written Memorials (on June 2, 1980)
Counter-Memorials (on June 5, 1981) and Replies (on April 27, 1981). The arbitration
agreement is reproduced at the beginning of the award.
"Arbitration agreement, Article 111.1. The remedy of specific performance (granted in the
TOPCO/CALASIATIC) was therefore excluded by the parties themselves, who were not, at
least in this respect, interested in an arbitrage deprincipe, which if successful permits to use at a
second stage restitutio in integrum as the yardstick for the measure of damages.
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conducting the proceedings. 4' The arbitrators were called upon to decide
"according to law" on the amounts owed by each party to the other.4 2 A new
choice of law clause was also inserted in the arbitration agreement. After the
parties had filed their written submissions, the arbitral tribunal issued an
order on June 30, 1981, pursuant to which the parties filed a joint accounting
expert report on questions of quantum on October 30, 1981. Furthermore,
the order contained the list (agreed between the parties) of the issues to be
addressed at the hearing on the merits, and Article IV(a)(7) of the order
provided that a subsequent hearing would be devoted to questions of
quantum. However, "this [subsequent hearing] was eventually found by the
tribunal to be unnecessary, and did not take place."43
IV. The Law of International Arbitration
A. THE ARBITRATION RELATIONSHIP
The law of the arbitration (lex arbitrationis, loi de l'arbitrage) can be
determined by the parties themselves; failing such a choice by the parties, it
will be selected by the arbitrators. The principle of party autonomy certainly
applies to transnational arbitration relationships,"' although the interna-
tional public policy of the laws potentially involved may impose some limits.
The whole arbitration relationship can be governed either by one law, or by
different laws, to take account of the contractual basis as well as the
jurisdictional character of the arbitral process (depecage). 5 The arbitration
agreement would thus be viewed as a different matter from the proceedings
and from the award. Furthermore, the arbitration agreement need not be
governed by the same law as the main contract, even when the former is but
a clause of the latter (principle of the severability of the arbitration clause) .'
41The parties did not refer to any set of arbitration rules (such as the detailed UNCITRAL
Rules), preferring to let the arbitrators adopt their own rules of procedure; these were adopted
on July 16, 1980 (the rules are reproduced in the award) and supplemented by the tribunal's
order of June 30, 1981 (made in agreement with the parties). This order fixed November 16,
1981 as the starting date of the oral hearings on the substantive issues (witnesses, expert
witnesses and oral arguments), which took place in Paris and lasted until December 17, 1981.
"
2Arbitration agreement, Art. 111.1.
"
3Award, paras. (xv) and 173. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 983 (1982). This change in the procedural
arrangements made by the tribunal was certainly within its power and did not constitute a
violation of due process giving a basis for annulment of the award under Articles 1504 and
1502(4) of the French new Code of Civil Procedure (especially since the parties had fully argued
the question of quantum in writing).
"4See the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (1975) [the
"I.C.C. Rules"], Article 11; the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion of 1961, Article IV; P. LALIVE, Problems Relatifs a l'Arbitrage International Commercial,
RECUEIL DES COURS, 1967.I1, 573, at 621.
4 5
DAvID, L'ARBITRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL, 85 (1982), and P. Lalive, supra,
note 44 at 610-13.46P. Lalive, id., at 594; and G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, § 13.08.
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As it turned out, there was little practical significance in determining the
law of the arbitration in the Aminoil dispute. The binding character of the
1979 arbitration agreement was not, and could hardly be, in question!
7
Furthermore, the conduct of the proceedings, as well as the validity"8 and
enforcement49 of the award did not give rise to any difference between the
parties. Aminoil and Kuwait, however, argued the question. The former
was in favor of the "delocalization" of the arbitration. The latter argued that
French law governed the arbitration pursuant to an implied choice of law
and because the place of arbitration was Paris. Such a controversy, in the
absence of a clear choice of arbitration law, is not new in arbitration of state
contracts5 There are advocates and arbitral "precedents" for the widest
range of solutions: an unavoidable municipal law, especially the lex loci
arbitri;5' a subjection to public international law52 on the basis of the manner
in which the arbitral tribunal is to be appointed or the choice of a particular
substantive law," or on the ground that the sovereign immunity of the
state party precludes application of another municipal law;54 transnational
47Delaume, State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 788-89
(1981). Aside from the undisputed validity of arbitration agreements made after the dispute
arose, such as the 1979 arbitration agreement, the validity and binding nature of arbitration
clauses preceding the dispute are assured, inter alia, by the 1958 Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention"), Article II.
48The arbitration agreement contains a waiver of "all rights of recourse to any Court, except
such rights as cannot be waived by the law of the place of arbitration." Article V. As an award
involving the interests of international trade, the Aminoil award is to be considered in France as
an "international award" governed by Articles 1498 to 1507 of the new Code of Civil Proce-
dure. The availability of an action for annulment against such an award under Article 1504
cannot be waived.4 9Enforcement can depend on the law applied to the arbitration. See Paulsson, Arbitration
Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 358
(1981).
5 Von Mehren and Kourides, see supra, note 3, at 504-09; Delaume, supra note 47, at 788.
"This position is based on a judicial, as opposed to contractual or "mixed" theory of
arbitration which does not suit international arbitration. But see F. A. Mann, Lex Facit
Arbitrum, International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke, 157, 159 (1967) 159;
Alsing Trading Co. Ltd. & Svenska Tandsticks Aktiebolaget v. The Greek State, 231. L. R. 633
(1956) [the "Alsing award"], which however was decided under the Geneva Protocol of 1923;
Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (1967), esp. 169 [ the
"Sapphire award"], B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1979) [the "B.P. award"].
2Even in the absence of a treaty such as the I.C.S.I.D. Convention or the Algiers Declaration
of 1981 concerning disputes between Iran and the United States, see FRAGISTAS, Arbitrage
etranger et arbitrage international en droit prive, REV. CRIT. DROIT INT'L PRIVE 1960 at 14.
3Texaco Overseas and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979) and 17 I.L.M. 3 (1978), portions of the original French text-at
104 J. DRoIT INT'L 350 (1977) (the "TOPCO/CALASIATIC award") at para. 13.
4Arabian American Oil Company v. Saudi Arabia, 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963) [the "ARAMCO
award"]. It would appear, however, that in many cases an implied waiver of immunity could be
found with respect to any proceeding directly relating to the arbitration. See Gruss, Enteignung
und Aufhebung von Erdoelkonzessionen: der Schiedsspruch im libyschen Erdoelstreit, 39
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law;55 or the agreement itself.5 6 The question is frequently left unanswered. 7
Finally, some arbitrators feel free to select a law on the basis of practical
considerations.58
The Aminoil tribunal's determination of the law of the arbitration (which
is called "procedure in the broadest sense" in the award) is twofold: as to the
mandatory procedural rules and rights of recourse that cannot be waived
(together with "everything that is implied" in these notions), French law
applies on the basis of the parties' choice to be found at Articles IV. 1 and V
of the Arbitration Agreement 9 The tribunal fell short, however, of deciding
that the lex arbitrationis was French law, as the award goes on to state that
"this does not in the least entail of itself a general submission to the law of
the tribunal's seat."'" Outside the French mandatory rules of procedure, the
arbitral tribunal found that the parties chose the principles of transnational
arbitration procedure." As in most transnational arbitrations, the fact that
the parties themselves selected the seat was not found to be an implied
choice of a lex fori.62 As already noted, the tribunal pointed out that the
designation of Paris as the tribunal's seat did not entail a general submission
to the law of that seat. This finding seems to imply that the parties were not
restricted in their freedom of choice to French law, and thus that they could
have "delocalized" the proceedings by subjecting them to another munici-
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [hereafter ZaoRV]
782, 787 (1979).55W. C. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND (1958); Zweigert, Vertraege zwischen staat-
lichen und nichtstaatlichen Partnern, BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FUR
VOELKERRECHT, Vol. 5, 194 (1964).
56VERDROSS, DIE SICHERUNG VON AUSLAENDISCHEN PRIVATRECHTEN AUS ABKOMMEN ZUR
WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG MIT SCHIEDSKLAUSELN, 17 ZaoRV 635 (1957-58).
57See, e.g., the I.C.C. Rules Article 11; and General National Maritime Transport Company
v. Societe Goetaverken Arendal A.B., C.A. Paris, Feb. 21, 1980, REV. DE L'ARB. 1980, 524.
See also Libyan American Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Republic, 20 I.L.M. 1 at 42
(1980) (the "LIAMCO award").
5 B.P. award, 53 I.L.R. 309-10; LIAMCO award, 20 I.L.M. 42-43. Practical considerations
often referred to in favor of the lexfori include: the need for an existing set of procedural rules,
the possibility of compelling a witness to appear and of removing or replacing an arbitrator, the
availability of means of recourse against the award, and the facilitation of enforcement of a
"national" award.
59Award, para. 3. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 999 (1982). Article IV.1 provides that "subject to any
mandatory provisions of the procedural law of the place in which the arbitration is held, the
Tribunal shall prescribe the procedure applicable .... " and Article V provides that "both
Parties ... hereby expressly waive all rights of recourse to any Court, except such rights as
cannot be waived by the law of the place of arbitration."
'Award, para. 4. Id.
61Award, paras. 4 and 5. Id.
62Arbitrators have applied the lex loci arbitri in cases where the place of arbitration had not
been selected by the parties (Sapphire award), and, on the other hand, arbitrators have not
applied that law although the place of arbitration had been chosen by the parties (Goetaverken
award and ARAMCO award). This is explained by the fact that the seat of the arbitration is
most often chosen for reasons of its neutrality and convenience, and bears no relation to the
parties or the dispute.
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pal law, international law or even perhaps to a third, transnational law in the
making.
B. THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP
Nationalizations and state contracts potentially raise many noncontrac-
tual questions governed by different laws. But disputes usually focus on the
relevant contractual undertakings of the state party. The law applicable to
the validity, interpretation and effect of these undertakings is therefore the
central conflicts issue.
1. Significance of the Proper
Law of the Contract
The effectiveness and interpretation of the relevant agreements made by
the parties can be affected-and with them the solution of the dispute-in
two ways by the selection of the proper law. First, contract laws not being
uniform, the selection of one or the other can result in different rights and
remedies.63 Second, as a particular contract law may be changed, the selec-
tion of the law of the state party, to the exclusion of other laws, may result in
that state's capacity to legislate with respect to the contract. Thus, any state
measure, however inconsistent with the contract, could be made lawful
under the host state law. So much so that the discussion often focuses, as it
did in the Aminoil case, on whether or not the host state law is alone the
proper law.
In relation to property rights, the scope of application of sovereign or
public measures taken by the state is determined by the international law
principle of territorial limitation.' The "immediate" or direct application of
lois de police and other public regulations of the state also follows the
territorial principle .65 Similarly, the principle of the state's sovereign right to
nationalize foreign investments on its territory is no longer seriously dis-
puted. On the other hand, with respect to contractual matters, the scope of
application of the host state law depends, not merely on territorial consid-
erations, but, rather, on other conflict-of-laws rules, the principle of which is
63See, e.g., specific performance in the B.P. award, Delaume, supra note 47, at 809.
6'Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 A.J.I.L. 600 (1961): "The territorial restriction of any
nationalization to the property located inside the taking state is one of the principles of
international law which has found uniform recognition in many countries of the world, both in
case law and in legal writings. Problems of territoriality, such as the situs of corporate interests
and of industrial property rights, are mainly concerned with conflict of laws, with private
international law, and therefore outside the framework of this article." [Footnotes omitted.]
But see SCHWARZENBERGER, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1957) at 85-86, to the effect that
international law does not contain a principle of no-extra-territorial jurisdiction.
65See Mayer, Les lois de police etrangeres, J. DROIT INT'L 277 (1981); Derains, Les Normes
d'application immediate dans la jurisprudence arbitrale internationale, LE DROIT DES RELATIONS
ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES, 29 (1982).
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that of party autonomy.' Indirectly, these rules determine the scope of
application of a measure of nationalization as a legislative act.
If the proper law is the host state's law, the nationalization measure is
self-justified, as the proper law includes the nationalization decree. But if
the proper law is not the host state law, the nationalization is not part of the
proper law and must be treated merely as an act of a party to the agreement.
Vis-A-vis the foreign party, the consequences of that act will be determined
having regard essentially to the state's relevant contractual commitments.67
The determination of the proper law was indeed crucial as the award states
that the Kuwaiti nationalization decree, if viewed only as a contractual
termination, would be a breach of contract.
2. The Conflict-of-Law Rules of the
Transnational Arbitrator
The contract cannot provide for the solution to questions such as its own
validity or interpretation. Furthermore, only a law can make the contract
legally binding. Traditionally, the only existing systems of law are interna-
tional law and municipal laws. On the one hand, the sovereignty of the state
party to the contract would seem to call for application of its own law when
the place of the investment and of performance of the contract is located on
its territory. On the other hand, the need to protect the foreign investor's
interest requires that not all conflicts between legislative measures of the
state party and its contractual duties be resolved against the binding charac-
ter of the contract for the state party. But the application of international
law as the proper law of state contracts would amount to conferring upon the
foreign investor a controversial, even though limited, capacity as a subject
of international law. There is also some doubt as to whether international
law contains sufficiently specific and adequate rules regarding state con-
tracts, as opposed to treaties.
Some authors6" and awards69 inquire directly, on the basis of objective
factors, as to the law from which state contracts derive their binding force.
'Contractual rights and obligations not incorporated in a commercial instrument are located
either where the obligor resides or has its office, or where the contract is localized (i.e, in the
state the law of which applies pursuant to choice of law rules). See Goldman, Les decisions du
Conseil Constitutionnel relatives aux nationalisations et le droit international, 109 J. DROIT INT'L
275, at 320 and note 123.67Cf. TOPCO/CALASIATIC award (the Libyan nationalization law was considered a fact
under the international law of contracts governing the concession, and could not by itself justify
a violation of the state's international obligations).
68Weil, Droit International et Contrats d'Etat, MELANGES REUTER, 545 at 562 (1981). For an
analysis of the purpose and effect of the Grundlegung theory as a means to protect the foreign
investor, see LEBOULANGER, LES CONTRATs ENTRE ETATS ET ENTERPRISES ETRANGERES, 316
(dissertation Paris 2, 1982).
69TOPCO/CALASIATIC award, para. 26; Revere Copper and Brass v. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, 17 I.L.M. 1321, 1337 (1978) [the "Revere award"].
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The quest for this "Grundlegung," or "ordrejuridique de base" bypasses the
conflict of laws.' The Grundlegung in turn allows the parties to make a
choice of law. The law thus chosen is incorporated by reference into the
contract. It cannot be the proper law of the contract, as the Grundlegung is
already supposed to give its binding force to the contract.'
Ordinarily, arbitrators do not feel compelled to discuss the conflict of laws
where the parties have made a clear choice of law, as the principle of party
autonomy is universally recognized. But if the existence, validity, meaning
or scope of the choice of law is called into question, that question must be
resolved by application of further legal rules. In addition, if no valid and
complete choice is found, the arbitrators must resort to other conflicts rules,
requiring characterization of the matters in dispute and determining the
proper law on the basis of objective connecting factors (such as the place of
execution, performance, objective localization or closest connection).
Aminoil advocated the application of the general principles of private
international law, while the government was in favor of applying the French
private international law of the place of arbitration.
The private international law of the place of arbitration, however, does
not appear to be suited to transnational arbitration. The arbitrators are in a
different situation from that of judges. When a case falls within their
jurisdiction, the latter may and must normally apply their local private
international law. The predominantly contractual nature of transnational
arbitration, however, especially when it takes place on the territory of some
"neutral" state bearing no relationship to the parties or the dispute at hand,
7 Mayer, Le Mythe de l'Ordre Juridique de Base (du Grundlegung), LE DROIT DES RELATIONS
ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES (MEL. GOLDMAN), 199, 213 (1982) (hereinafter Mayer).
The distinction between proper law and law sustaining the contract has been criticized by F. A.
Mann and I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, see 57 ANNUAIRE INST. DROIT INT'L Vol. I, note 21, p. 228.
Their arguments, however, do not purport to demonstrate that the distinction between proper
law and law sustaining the choice of the proper law is not needed, but rather that the proper law
chosen by the parties is also the law sustaining the contract.
71Mayer, id., at 209. Gradually, however, the Grundlegung has become the law giving its
binding force to the choice of law clause, while the chosen law is giving force to the contract. Id.,
at 207-208. Thus, the chosen law is the proper law and the Grundlegung only indirectly sustains
the contract. Therefore, when there is a choice of law, the concept of Grundlegung adds a
binding and irrevocable effect to the choice of law clause. (Since a state may at any time change
its conflict of law rules, BATIFFOL and LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, note 20 etseq. (7th
ed.), it has been argued that a decision of nationalization could implicitly and retroactively
invalidate a choice of law clause.) When there is no choice of law, the Grundlegung plays the
role of objective rules of conflict of laws. In any instance, the Grundlegung translates, in the
field of state contracts, an aspiration toward a preexisting source of law of state contract which
would be uniformly recognized by transnational arbitrators, as opposed to the selection of a law
after the fact and contingent on conflicts rules. It is submitted, however, that the concept of
Grundlegung is not very useful to the extent that arbitrators should always follow the expecta-
tions of the parties and disregard one party's attempts unilaterally to change the applicable law.




precludes as purely artificial any inference drawn from a geographic location
to a juridical localization of the arbitration process in a lex fori. Further-
more, the application of the arbitration law of the place of arbitration cannot
be an argument to apply also the conflicts rules of the forum, as there is no
necessary link between these two fields of law. Consequently, in trans-
national arbitral practice, there appears to be a growing tendency on the
part of arbitral tribunals to adopt solutions which are common to the legal
systems involved, rather than applying any national system of private inter-
national law.
The Aminoil award does not state to which body of law the rules applied
to the validity and interpretation of the choice of law belong. Like many
others, the Aminoil tribunal may have proceeded implicitly on the basis of
general principles of conflict of laws or at least of conflicts rules common to
all the states involved. This is evidenced by the absence of any reference to a
particular private international law, particularly that of France.
This approach has the advantage that the choice of the place of arbitration
does not determine the conflict rules to be applied and, indirectly, the law
applicable on the merits and even possibly the outcome of the case (which
might give rise to forum shopping). Whatever the place of arbitration may
be, the same conflicts rules should apply to any given state contract, with the
resulting uniformity and predictability of solutions. This ideal solution
assumes, however, that the arbitrators at least implicitly follow some con-
flicts rules. Their freedom from the lex loci arbitri should not result in an
arbitrary selection of the applicable law.
3. Significance of the Choice of
Law Clause
The effect of a choice of law can be viewed in two ways. Either it
incorporates the chosen law into the contract, such a law being applied only
by reference. Or it is a factor, among others, in localizing the contract in the
chosen law, that law applying as such and not as part of a contract.
The Aminoil tribunal found that in Article 111.2 of the arbitration agree-
ment the parties had "indicated" what the applicable law was 3 Hence, they
made a choice of law. Yet, in determining the applicable law, the tribunal
relied primarily on the objective factor that Kuwait law was in some respects
the law "most directly involved.'" 4 The choice of law clause appears as an
additional ground, together with the government's assertion that interna-
tional law is part of the law of Kuwait.75
73
"[T]he parties have themselves, in effect, indicated in the Arbitration Agreement what the
applicable law is." Award, para. 8.
74Award, para. 6. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1000 (1982).
"Award, paras. 8 and 6. Id.
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One may wonder whether the solution would have been different if the
1979 choice of law clause had clearly been in favor of law other than Kuwaiti
law. This is what Aminoil had argued, but the tribunal interpreted the clause
differently.76 Certainly the tribunal would have given effect to any clear
manifestation of the intention of the parties. But would a non-Kuwait law
have been applied as law or as a part of the contract? The question would
have been relevant had Kuwait subsequently attempted to pass legislation
purporting to apply to the contract and inconsistent with the chosen law. For
instance, notwithstanding the provisions of the chosen law, the state could
pass a prohibition of stabilization in long-term state contracts. It could at
least be argued that a foreign chosen law applied as part of a contract which
is localized in the host state could be modified by legislative measures of that
state. Such measures, however, could not modify a foreign chosen law if it
applies as law. Be that as it may, it would seem that the effect given by the
Aminoil tribunal to the choice of law clause was rather that of an additional
factor localizing the concession in Kuwait. This is further confirmed by the
tribunal's interpretation of that clause.
4. Interpretation of the
Choice of Law Clause
Article 111.2 of the Arbitration Agreement provided as follows:
The law governing the substantive issues between the Parties shall be determined
by the Tribunal, having regard to the quality of the Parties, the transnational
character of their relations and the principles of law and practice prevailing in the
modern world.
This clause calls for interpretation because the parties did not expressly
name the applicable law, but only mentioned guidelines for determining
what this law was. In 1979, the parties could not agree on the question of the
substantive law governing their past relationship, but they were not willing
to leave the question completely open for the arbitrators to decide. Conse-
quently, short of agreeing on a clear choice of substantive law, the parties
selected-indeed created-a rule of private international law to be applied
by the arbitrators.
77
According to the government, Article 111.2 did not contain any choice of
law by the parties, but entrusted the tribunal with the determination of the
applicable law. The nonexhaustive guidelines of Article 111.2, as well as
other objective reasons, were thus said to localize the contractual rela-
tionship in Kuwait. Aminoil's position, on the other hand, was that Article
76See infra, next section.
'The validity of such a clause seems beyond doubt. See, e.g., P. Lalive, Les regles de conflit de




111.2 embodied both a "negative choice" excluding Kuwait law and a posi-
tive (although perhaps partial and not completely explicit) choice of the
general principles of law as the proper law of the contract' In the alterna-
tive, Aminoil submitted that the selection of the general principles of law
would in any instance result from objective factors, such as the arbitration
and stabilization clauses of the concession and its character as an economic
development agreement."
The arbitral tribunal decided that the choice of law contained in the
arbitration agreement was to be interpreted with the presumption that it did
not change the law applicable before the beginning of the arbitration.'0 The
arbitrators found that the clause is in agreement with the selection, on other
grounds, of a "blend" of Kuwait and international law, as the clause "brings
out the wealth and fertility of the set of legal rules that the Tribunal is called
upon to apply."'"
5. Selected Blend of the Host State
Law and International Law
The Aminoil tribunal's solution of applying the law most directly involved
is similar to the formulation of the Institute of International Law, which
provides, failing a choice of law, for the application of the legal rules with
which the contract has the closest connection. 2 However, as an additional
ground for its selection of Kuwait law in this case, the tribunal also relied on
the fact that international law is part of the law of Kuwait and is thus also to
be applied. The solution is then similar to that provided, failing a choice of
law by the parties, by Article 42 of the I.C.S.I.D. Convention.83 In selecting
the two traditional sources of law, the Aminoil tribunal may seem to have
retreated from the progress made toward the recognition of a third source-
a transnational customary law in the making (lex mercatoria). The award
78It is indeed generally accepted today that parties to a state contract may choose as the
proper law of their contract the general principles of law, or even international law. Resolution
of the Institute of International Law (Athens, 1979). See also Delaume, supra note 47, at
796-97. Aminoil produced several authoritative legal opinions demonstrating the standing
(including under Kuwait law) of the following general principles: pacta sunt servanda, repara-
tion for injury, respect for acquired rights, the prohibition of unjust enrichment, and the
requirement of good faith, including the prohibition against abus de droit, estoppel and
preclusion. Aminoil's Memorial para. 122.
7
"Aminoil's Memorial, para. 113-14. Cf. Delaume, supra note 47, at 798-801; J.-F. Lalive,
Un grand arbitrage petrolier entre un Gouvernement et deux societes etrangeres, 104 J. DROIT
INT'L 337-8 (1977).
8
"'his also explains why the tribunal referred first to the objective localization and choice of
law clause of the contract prior to 1979, including the choice of law clause of the draft 1973
agreement-reproduced in the award, at para. 6-, and only examined at a second stage
whether the parties had made a different choice of law in the arbitration agreement.
8 Award, para. 9. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1001 (1982).
8 Annuaire of the Institute, 1979 (Athens) Resolution, at 192.
83See supra note 36.
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achieves, however, a most significant contribution to the development of a
separate body of rules governing state contracts. Instead of relying on a third
legal system, the award relies on the combining of the traditional "different
sources of the law thus to be applied" and by "taking advantage of their
resources." The general principles of law being part of international law,
they are one of "the different legal elements involved."'
The regime resulting from this "blend" of Kuwait law and international
law, the tribunal notes, happens to be the same as the regime of oil conces-
sions in force in Kuwait, as evidenced by their choice of law clauses 5 The
Aminoil tribunal seems to have given weight to the desirability of achieving
the unity of the applicable rules, not only in time (presuming that the 1979
choice of law clause was not intended to change the applicable law), but also
in space (stressing that it was logical that all Kuwaiti concessions be gov-
erned by the same rules). Under the Aminoil doctrine, the common princi-
ples of the host state and international law, which were applied in the Libyan
arbitrations on the basis of a choice-of-law clause, may tend to become, in
the form of a "blend," the ordinary law applicable in the absence of a clear
contrary choice by the parties.6
The result of such an approach, however, could not result in "[i]gnoring
this vital element in the negotiating process" which is the choice of law
clause.! This criticism was convincingly raised with regard to a similar
approach followed in the Sapphire arbitration, but it would not seem to
apply when, as in the Aminoil arbitration, a new and somewhat imprecise
choice of law clause has been agreed after the dispute arose.
As to the matters on which Kuwait law is not the most directly involved,
the award neither says what they are, nor states the law applicable to them:
On these matters, Kuwait law was either not applicable or only applicable to
the extent that it conformed to international law or the general principles of
law. It would appear, however, that the major issues in dispute are within
the scope of application of the blend of Kuwait and international law.
'Award, para. 10. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1001 (1982).
851d., para. 7. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1000. The tribunal noted Kuwait's practice of referring in its
various concession agreements to legal principles common to the laws of the parties and
concluded that the regime of Kuwaiti concessions is based on the general principles of law.
'See Delaume, supra note 47, at 786 (Article 42 of the I.C.S.I.D. Convention "can be
considered as illustrative of a principle of wider application"). This view was followed in S.P.P.
(Middle East) Limited and Southern Pacific Properties Limited v. The Arab Republic of Egypt
and the Egyptian General Company for Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH), 22 I.L.M. 752 at 769,
para. 49. As a result, the presumption of the Serbian Loans case ("Any contract which is not a
contract between states in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the
municipal law of some country") followed in the ARAMCO award (27 I.L.R. at 165) and
rejected in the TOPCO/CALASIATIC award (17 I.L.M. at 16, para. 43), would no longer
exist. Judgment of July 12, 1929, P.C.I.J. Ser. A, Nos. 20/21, at 41.
8 7Delaume, supra note 47, at 800.
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Concretely, the award makes reference mostly to general principles and
international law, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.!
6. Content of Applicable Law
As to the Kuwait law component of the proper law, a further question
arises as to whether that law was validly "stabilized" or "frozen" in some
respects pursuant to the stabilization clauses of the concession, or whether
Decree-Law No. 124 of 1977 is part of that applicable law. Although
arguably a choice-of-law question, the stabilization clauses are discussed in
the award in relation to the lawfulness of the nationalization 9
As regards the international law component, on the other hand, its
coming into play depends on the existence of international rules dealing with
state contracts or which at least could be applied by analogy. If Kuwaiti and
international law are not in harmony (a situation which did not occur in the
case), the latter would prevail, as its supremacy would prevent the state
from asserting its own law (such as a nationalization decree) to justify a
breach of its international obligations. The existence of international rules,
however, is controverted with respect to the question of the validity (as
opposed to the lawfulness) of a measure of nationalization.' As to the
standard of protection of foreign property or contractual rights, it is rather
the content of international rules that is subject to controversy. The scope of
international law is greatly increased in the Aminoil case, inasmuch as it
applies also as a component of the lex contractus. In the transnational
arbitral context, the standing of the foreign investor to assert claims under
international law is generally recognized, even when international law is not
the lex contractus'
"See 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1005 ("national and international practice" and the Vienna Conven-
tion), 1006 (Vienna Convention), 1007 ("Systems of all countries"), 1013-14 (general princi-
ples, ICJ and arbitration cases), 1016 ("the principles") (ICJ cases), 1023 ("fundamental
principle"), 1023-24 ("in most legal systems"), 1024 (Vienna Convention), 1025 ("In private
law, as in international law relationships"), and 1032 ("principally international law"). In
addition, if Kuwait law per se had been applied on the main issues, the tribunal would have had
to deal with difficult constitutional and other issues of Kuwait law which had been fully laid
before it; but the tribunal did not do so. Kuwait law was referred to in particular on the
authority of the Minister of Oil and on the regulations governing the conclusion of state
contracts. Award, paras. 73 and 85.
8 9Award, paras. 88 etseq. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1020 (1982).
'It is considered by some authors that the validity of a nationalization is governed exclusively
by municipal law, so that a nationalization is considered as a fact under international law.
VERHOEVEN, I DROIT INTERNATIONAL 20 (1981); Weil, A.F.D.I. 1977, 9 Contra: LIAMCO
award, according to which the act of nationalization is "subject to international law whenever
foreign elements [are] at issue." 20 I.L.M. at 95.
9 Norwegian Shipowners' Claims, Award of October 13, 1922, 1 R.I.A.A. 307 at 330-31. It
has been argued that international law is designed to protect only the subjects of international
law, whereas the individuals are only the objects thereof, but this objection is losing ground
even outside the arbitral forum, as the number of instances where international law benefits
individuals is increasing. See also I.C.S.I.D. Convention, Article 42; Weil, Droit International
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V. Nature and Regime of
the Concession
As presented above, the characterization of the concession did not play an
important part in the determination of the proper law. However, the nature
of the concession appears more clearly from the specific rules applied by the
tribunal to the concession under the applicable law.
A. REGIME OF STATE CONTRACTS
IN GENERAL
What are the existing general principles relating to state contracts? Some
authors have advocated de lege ferenda, the application by analogy of the
theory of the administrative contract. 2 State contracts would thus not be
equally binding and immutable for both parties, unlike contracts between
private parties or treaties between states. Rather, allowance would be made
in their contractual regime for the exercise (by unilateral modification of the
contract) of the state's prerogatives in the public interest, subject to the right
of the foreign party to have the financial equilibrium of the contract pre-
served. Such a regime applies in France to those contracts entered into by
the state which relate to a public service or contain clauses differing from
ordinary contract law, i.e., clauses the purpose of which is the opposite of
that of stabilization clauses.
In the proceedings, the government of Kuwait had "suggested a similarity
between the oil concession agreement and the famous 'contrat admin-
istratif' of French law."93 The concession was said to have acquired a public
nature because of the public interest involved in the exploitation of oil. This
nature would entitle the government unilaterally to modify and terminate
the concession' Aminoil, on the other hand, stressed "the commitment
undertaken by the government in ... the stabilization clause.' '9
Following prior awards,96 the Aminoil tribunal denied the existence of a
et Contrats d'Etat, MELANGES REUTER, at 568. It could even be argued that the right to give
diplomatic protection exists only after any available arbitral remedies have been exhausted by
the national concerned. Cf. I.C.S.I.D. Convention, Article 27.
92Fatouros, The Administrative Contract in Transnational Transactions: Reflections on the
Uses of Comparison, FESTSCHRIFr RHEINSTEIN, at 259; see also more restrictively, Weil, Droit
International et Contrats d'Etat, MELANGES REUTER, at 570. See also Batiffol in note to the
AGIP award (infra note 96) in REV. CRIT. DROIT INT'L PRIvE 1982, at 105 et seq.
9 The Government's Reply, at 2.57.
"Id., at 2.87.
95Aminoil's Counter-Memorial, para. 181.
wIOPCO/CALASIATIC award, 17 I.L.M. at 19, para. 54 and at 25, para. 72; ARAMCO
award, 27 I.L.R. at 164. In two recent I.C.S.I.D. awards, where the municipal law of the host
state was similar to French law, no reference was made to the administrative contract. AGIP
Company v. Popular Republic of the Congo, 21 I.L.M. 726 et seq. (1982), French original in
REV. CRIT. DROIT INT'L PRIVE 1982, at 92 et seq., Benvenuti et Bonfant v. People's Republic of
the Congo, 21 I.L.M. at 740 et seq. (1982).
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general principle of administrative contract?7 Nonetheless, the arbitrators
accepted to some extent the government's view, as the award notes that "the
general principles of law recognize the rights of the state in its capacity of
supreme protector of the general interest."9 Furthermore, Aminoil's con-
cession "became one of those contracts in regard to which, in most legal
systems, the state while remaining bound to respect the contractual equilib-
rium, enjoys special advantages."99 Finally, "the Concession had become a
contract under the changed regime of which the state had, over the years,
acquired a special position that included the right to terminate it."'" The
process by which this changed regime was brought about, as well as its
financial consequences is reviewed by the arbitral tribunal in relation to the
interpretation of the stabilization clauses."0 ' This is not to say, however, that
the stabilization clauses had no effect on the regime of the contract.'
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE
RENEGOTIATION CLAUSE
Pursuant to the renegotiation clause, 3 consultation relating to changes in
the financial terms of the concession started in the mid-1960s, in the form of
negotiations initiated by the government, and continued from time to time
until the termination of the concession in 1977. These negotiations led
successively to some agreements in 1973-74, the validity of which was later
challenged by Aminoil," 4 and to a deadlock in 1976-77. °1
To a large extent, the nature-evolutionary or stable-of the entire
97Award, para. 91. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1023-24 (1982).
90ld., para. 10, 21 I.L.M. 976, id. at 1001. The LIAMCO award has already recognized the
"mixed public and private legal character" of a concession contract, stressing however its
"predominant contractual nature." 20 I.L.M. at 30.
"Id., para. 98. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1023.
"'Id., para. 113; see also para. 100. 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1026 and 1024.
'See infra notes 168 to 181 and accompanying text.
""As a result of these clauses, the regime of the concession was not "the same as that of any
contract." Award, para. 89. 21 I.L.M. 976 at 1020 (1982).
"
3Article 9 of the 1961 Supplemental Agreement reads as follows:
"If, as a result of changes in the terms of concessions now in existence or as a result of the
terms of concessions granted hereafter, an increase in benefits to Governments in the Middle
East should come generally to be received by them, the Company shall consult with the Ruler
whether in the light of all relevant circumstances, including the conditions in which opera-
tions are carried out, and taking into account all payments made, any alterations in the terms
of the agreements between the Ruler and the Company would be equitable to the parties."
Article 9 reproduced a clause known (improperly) in the oil industry as a "most-favored-
nation" clause and inserted into most concession contracts in the Gulf. Pursuant to the
Confidential Letter of the same date as the Supplemental Agreement, the word "benefits"
used in Article 9 was meant to "include arrangements not involving payments."
"
0
'See supra notes 19-20, and accompanying text.
'See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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concession depended on the interpretation of the renegotiation clause. The
government's interpretation was in favor of an application as automatic as
possible to Aminoil of any "increase in benefits to governments in the
Middle East [which] should come generally to be received by them."
"Aminoil," it argued, "was obliged to implement such changes in the terms
of concession terms [sic] introduced by other parties in the Middle East as
were equitable."'1 6 In the government's view, the concession had become "a
framework for relationships between the parties which is capable of chang-
ing to meet continuously changing circumstances."1 7 Aminoil, on the other
hand, while recognizing its duty to negotiate in good faith in the case of
changes as foreseen by Article 9, emphasized the need to have mutual
consent and to take account of its special operating conditions.
To determine whether a general increase in benefits to governments had
occurred, "a first estimate has to be made by the two Parties."1 8 But when
such a development has occurred, "the company does not thereby recognize
only its obligation to negotiate, but also the existence in principle of an
obligation, of which only the numerical computation remains unsettled
prior to the negotiation."'" One could argue that negotiations could also
take place with the object of determining whether it was equitable to make
any alteration at all. Practically, however, the difference between the par-
ties in this case concerned the extent of the alterations rather than their
principle. And Sir G. Fitzmaurice concurred precisely for the reason that in
the case at hand "the principle of something being due on Abu Dhabi
account [had] been conceded.""' Were it not for such a concession, Sir G.
Fitzmaurice would have agreed with Aminoil's view, "namely that in the
absence of bad faith or other laches on either side, the failure of the Parties
to reach agreement created a situation of 'no-change' in which matters [... I
simply went on as before-unaffected."I" In cases where a government
would have less bargaining power, however, this view might result in perpet-
uating a situation which could no longer be viewed as "equitable." In such
cases, the interpretation of a renegotiation clause should give more weight,
""The Government's Reply, para. 3.78. The government emphasized that "Article 9 pro-
vided the contractual nexus between the government's obligations to OPEC and Aminoil's
obligations to Kuwait" (id., para. 3.81), and noted that the aim of Article 9 was to bring about
parity in the terms of the concessions in the Middle East (id., para. 3.86).
"'The Government's Memorial, para. 3.28; the Government's Reply, para. 2.57. The
government recognized, however, that allowance was to be made for Aminoil's difficult
operating conditions.
"°Award, para. 19; 21 I.L.M. 976 at 1002 (1982).
"Id., paras. 24 and 79.2; 21 I.L.M. 976 at 1003 and 1017.
"'Separate Opinion, para. 15. See also para. 17, characterizing the difference as a mere
"failure to agree about figures."
"'Id., para. 14. Similarly the award states that "[aln obligation to negotiate is not an
obligation to agree." Id., para. 24. See also Railway Traffic Lithuania-Poland, P.C.I.J., Ser.
A/B, No. 42, at 116.
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as the main award did, to the fact that the purpose of direct investment is the
development of the host country."2
Given that Aminoil had recognized that the adoption by OPEC in No-
vember 1974 of the "Abu Dhabi formula," which provided for increased tax
and royalty payments to be computed on the "posted prices" of oil, trig-
gered its obligation to negotiate; that the renegotiation clause "does not
suffice of itself to indicate what the concrete content of the new obligation is
to be"; 3 that the clause "did not provide for any other method of applying
the criteria enunciated than agreement by mutual consent"; 14 that no agree-
ment was reached between the parties; and that the concession was thereaf-
ter terminated, the arbitrators had to decide two questions. The first ques-
tion was whether the failure to agree had been caused by one party's breach
of its duty to negotiate. The tribunal applied here the general principles of
"good faith as properly to be understood; sustained upkeep of the negotia-
tions over a period appropriate to the circumstances; awareness of the
interests of the other party; and a persevering quest for an acceptable
compromise.""' 5 Since the arbitral tribunal found that no such breach ex-
isted, the Abu Dhabi formula did not raise an issue of responsibility.
The second question to be decided was what alterations to the concession
were equitable and should have been agreed between the parties. While the
arbitrators recognized that the parties had not given them the power to
complete (prospectively) an incomplete contract, they found in the arbitra-
tion agreement the power to "liquidate" a past relationship and to deter-
mine whether Aminoil's obligations should have been increased in 1976-77
on account of the Abu Dhabi formula. 6
The fact that the arbitral tribunal had to reach its decision "according to
law" did not prevent it from assessing the sum of money owed by Aminoil on
the basis of "equitable" considerations as provided by the renegotiation
clause. "It is well known that any estimate in money terms of amounts
intended to express the value of an asset, of an undertaking, of a contract, or
of services rendered, must take equitable principles into account. '" 7 "Eq-
uity" then is not the basis of the decision, but serves only to make a precise
determination pursuant to a rule of law.
To ascertain the equitable increase in payments to the government ret-
roactively applicable for the period 1975-77, the arbitrators relied mostly on
Aminoil's initial negotiating position in 1976. Such an initial position
"'In favor of an interpretation taking account of the development purpose, see Weil supra
note 68, at 549; and Kahn, L'interpretation des contrats internationaux, 108 J. DROIT INT'L at 22
(1981).
"
3Award, para. 24; I.L.M. 976, 1003 (1982).
1141d.
"Ild., para. 70(i); 21 I.L.M. 976 at 1013.
1d., para. 75; 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1016.
"'Id., para. 78.
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"reflects, at least grosso modo, the way in which that party assesses its rights
and obligations on the juridical plane. 118 Aminoil was constantly seeking
"to maintain for itself, as far as circumstances permitted the essential
features of a contract of concession, while being willing to confine its profits
within the limits of 'reasonable return'."'' 9 The rate of return used by the
arbitral tribunal was set at 10 million dollars per year.'20 The amount owed by
Aminoil on account of the Abu Dhabi formula consists of "the profits
received by the company in excess of what would have constituted a reason-
able rate of return, after taking account of its operating conditions-such a
rate of return having always been the basis of its position and legitimate
expectations at this time."' 2'
C. VALIDITY OF INTERIM AGREEMENT
Before the 1976-77 negotiations on the Abu Dhabi formula, other
lengthy negotiations have resulted in a 1973 draft agreement. The govern-
ment requested, and Aminoil agreed in a letter of December 22, 1973, to
apply this draft immediately on the understanding that it would be signed
and ratified as soon as possible as required by Kuwait law.'22 This, however,
was never done. Instead, the government imposed changes in the draft
agreement on several occasions in 1974, and Aminoil never had the relative
security of a signed and ratified agreement, which it considered as the quid
pro quo for its acceptance of higher financial obligations. Aminoil therefore
argued that the signature and ratification of the 1973 agreement was a
condition unfulfilled and that it was entitled to the return of its payments
made pursuant to the letter of December 22, 1973 .123 The Tribunal, however,
found that this letter, while it never took the place of the July 1973 draft
agreement, was a valid agreement on an "interim basis" pending its "final
conclusion."'24 As a result, Aminoil's payments were not found to have been
made subject to a valid condition. In support of this finding, Sir G. Fitz-
maurice noted that when Aminoil used the word "understanding" in its
letter of December 22, 1973, it "knew, or feared, that nothing more explicit
"'Id., para. 59; 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1011.
19Award, para. 70(ii); 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1014.
1'20 d., para. 176.2; 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1040.
'Id., para. 79.3; 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1017.
'The letter reads in relevant part as follows:
"It is our understanding that the 1973 Agreement will be signed as soon as the final
documents can be prepared and that you [i.e., the Minister] will then take appropriate steps
to obtain due ratification thereof."
"'
23Aminoil also invoked the theories of frustration and failure of consideration. Thus,
Aminoil's position was that the terms of the 1961 Supplemental Agreement remained unaltered
in 1977. Consequently, the company was claiming a refund of its increased payments made
conditionally under the December 22, 1973 letter.
24Award, para. 32; 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1005 (1982).
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would be accepted [by the government]."' 25 The tribunal found that the
authority of the Minister of Finance and Oil to sign such a simplified form
agreement, and more generally to deal in transnational economic relations
must be presumed."6 However, each party had the right, because of the
interim nature of the 1973 agreement, "to give notice to bring it to an end if
the conclusion of the definitive agreement was unduly delayed."' 7 The
tribunal did not find any undue delay because the government had reasons
other than "malevolent intentions or neglectfulness" to delay the conclusion
of the final agreement. 2" These reasons mainly related to internal political
pressure. Sir G. Fitzmaurice, however, considered that Aminoil's right to
terminate the 1973 agreement was based on a failure of consideration and
had arisen when it became clear after several years that signature and
ratification were not forthcoming.1I9
But, in any instance, neither party gave a notice of termination, and the
1973 interim agreement, as modified several times, remained in force until
the takeover in 1977.
D. DURESS
Aminoil alleged that at the time of signature of the 1973 interim agree-
ment on December 22, 1973 and thereafter, the company acted under
duress, more specifically under threats of "shut-down" of its operations in
KuwaitY.3 0 State-investor economic coercion has been the subject of legal
writings,'3 ' but a transnational tribunal still had not produced a definition of
duress requisite to nullify a coerced state contract, i.e., to draw the line
between what is duress and what is normal economic pressure which com-
panies have to tolerate in transnational economic relations.32
A distinction must be made between "strong economic pressure" (which
was found to exist in the context of the 1973 interim agreement) and
pressure requisite to bring about nullification (which was found to be
lacking). 3 Strong economic pressure cannot invalidate a consent, but has
two consequences. The induced consent may not be extensively interpreted
and may be withheld on another occasion. And, "consents that are legally
valid as regards the abandonment of a specific individual right, but which
" Separate Opinion, para. 10.
'
261d., para. 33. In addition, such authority was found to exist at Kuwait law.
11
7Award, para. 34; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1006.
1'SAward, para. 37. Id.
12 1Separate Opinion, para. 12.
3
'See supra note 21.
.
3 See Vagts, Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 A.J.I.L. 17 (1978) and
writings cited at footnote 1 thereof.
1
321d., at 22-25.
133Award, para. 41; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1007.
VOL. 18, NO. 2
Symposium/Aminoil Award 271
have been given under economic constraint, cannot serve as precedents for
establishing a customary rule of general validity." '134 A consent is void for
duress only if the "nature of the object in view, or of the means employed" is
illegal, or if there is no other course of action available.
While a threat of shut-down could hardly escape being characterized as
illegal in the circumstances, the arbitrators found that the nature of the
threats had not been fully proven by Aminoil.135 As to the test of the absence
of any other possible course of action, the tribunal considered that the
alternative of going to arbitration or even simply entering subsequent pro-
tests (which Aminoil did not do before the arbitration proceedings, prob-
ably because it feared that this would bring about the end of its relationship
with Kuwait) were such other possible courses of action. Aminoil therefore
was found to have had a freedom of choice and to have chosen to stay in
Kuwait and live with the government's demands. Sir G. Fitzmaurice points
out that "the essence of [the] constraint [... ] was not so much any direct
government threat of a 'shut-down' (though a latent threat of it unquestion-
ably existed), as Aminoil's own natural desire-and hence long-term pol-
icy-of wanting to continue to operate in Kuwait, if it was at all possible to
do so on reasonable terms." '136
A similar solution applies to several measures imposed by the government
without any express consent of Aminoil and in violation of the concession,
e.g., the posting and modification of oil prices by the government in October
and November 1973, the 1974 amendments to the 1973 interim agreement
on account of the Teheran and Geneva Agreements, and other increases in
Aminoil's financial obligations. There was a valid implicit consent of Amin-
oil, "whether this result is arrived at on the basis of the mutual conduct of the
Parties as constituting an informal agreement, or whether-denying the
existence of any contractual element-it is considered that the company
simply acquiesced in an unjustified compulsion." t3
VI. Validity and Effect of the Takeover
A. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TAKEOVER
Was the takeover a contractual termination (or breach) governed by
principles of (Kuwaiti and international) contract law; or was it a national-
'
1 Id., para. 42; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1007.
1351d., para. 43. The test of "illegality" as regards acts of a state seems extremely difficult to
meet. As a result, an investor party to a transnational arbitration should refrain from alleging
illegal threats on the part of the state, unless the investor is able to establish this complaint with
such certainty as to outweigh the counterproductive effect of such an allegation in relation to a
possible settlement and to the general spirit in which the arbitration proceedings are conducted.
36Separate Opinion, para. 5.
'
7Award, para. 48; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1008 (1982). It is, however, at times unclear in the award
whether Aminoil ever had a valid defense of duress or whether it has abandoned it.
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ization governed by (Kuwaiti and international) rules concerning national-
ization? The government had alleged as grounds for the termination of the
concession that Aminoil had breached its obligation to negotiate in good
faith under Article 9 and had not complied with the standards of good oil
field practice. The tribunal found, however, that these grounds lacked any
foundation, and could not be taken into account anyway, as they related to
past facts never alleged by the government before the decree-law was
issued.3" The government seems to have shifted the emphasis of its position
during the proceedings, from an essentially contractual termination for
cause to a measure of nationalization or both.'39 Aminoil contended that the
decree-law should be characterized as a contractual termination (in breach
of the contract) because of its alleged predominant contractual motives and
background.
The tribunal characterized the decree-law at the outset as "at one and the
same time the termination of a contract, and also a nationalization.""'4 The
lawfulness of the decree-law would therefore seem to depend on the exis-
tence of either a contractual right to terminate the concession or a sovereign
right of the state to nationalize Aminoil's assets in Kuwait.
B. PUBLIC INTEREST CRITERION
Whether this is a condition of validity or of lawfulness of the measure,
the right to nationalize must be exercised in the public interest. 4' The
Aminoil tribunal defined nationalization as a "transfer, in the public inter-
est, of property from the private to the public sector," thus "realizing a
programme of economic development."'4 When a state clearly purports to
act in the public interest, a transnational tribunal may refrain from review-
ing the adequacy of the alleged public purpose. 3 But in view of the ambigu-
3
'Id. paras. 81(1), 104 and 105; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1017 and 1024.
1391d., paras. 81(4) and 105; 21 I.L.M. 976, at 1018 and 1024.
141d., par. 81(4); 21 I.L.M. 976, 1017. This language seems to suggest the idea that the
government acted simultaneously under two "hats," on two different planes, and should be
perhaps judged under two different sets of rules.
4 
'The Aminoil tribunal discussed public interest and nondiscrimination as conditions of
validity of a nationalization. Compare the B.P. Award, where the requirements of a general
interest and nondiscrimination were considered conditions of lawfulness (the Libyan nationa-
lization was found unlawful because of its discriminating character). The result might be the
same, however, as an invalid nationalization would normally not be lawful under any other
characterization.
'
42Award, paras. 84 and 87; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1018-19 (1982). See also the definition of the
Institute of International Law: "Nationalization is the transfer to the State by legislative act and
in the public interest, of property or private rights of a designated character, with a view to their
exploitation or control by the State, or to their direction to a new objective by the State."
ANNUAIRE INST. INT'L L. 283 (1952); and AKINSANYA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF MULTINATIONAL
PROPERTY IN THE THIRD WORLD, 20 (1980) ("public utility, security, or national interest").
'
43TOPCO/CALASIATIC Award, para. 50. See also Akinsanya, id., at 20. This is the
consequence of the difficulty in fact of reviewing the state's assessment of the general interest.
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ity existing in the language of the decree-law, of the company's allegation
that it was aimed primarily at resolving a contractual dispute, and of the shift
in the position of the government itself during the proceedings, the tribunal
could not merely note that the state really purported to nationalize rather
than to exercise a contractual right. The fact that the termination of the
concession was formally effected by a decree-law does not necessarily imply
that the measure was in essence a nationalization, as a termination on the
contractual plane could also be expressed through a decree-law.
The Aminoil tribunal found the requisite public interest in the overall
policy of Middle-Eastern states belonging to OPEC, the result of which is
the nationalization of the whole local petroleum industry." The tribunal
clearly recognized, however, that the process of nationalization could not be
validly used for the main purpose of escaping contractual obligations, in-
cluding the obligation to negotiate changes in the contract. The review by
the arbitrators of the genuineness of the public interest asserted by the state,
or at least of the absence of any detournement de pouvoir, should be
encouraged."5 If the state's public purpose is the test, it appears crucial that
it can be reviewed to some extent by impartial arbitrators. An award even
goes so far as to suggest that nationalization should be used only if there is no
other possible way to fulfill the state's public interest."6
In the Aminoil case, the characterization of the decree-law turned on
whether the contractual situation was the main purpose or only an addi-
tional effect of the termination of Aminoil's concession. While recognizing
that the "state of relations between the company and the government [...]
played a major part in the termination,"'' the tribunal found that this
contractual situation had been decisive only as to the date of the decree-
law .14
8
The act of state doctrine does not apply in transnational arbitration, however, as it is justified by
constitutional reasons (separation of powers), which are foreign to arbitration. At any rate, the
trend in the United Kingdom and in the United States is not to apply the doctrine when a
nationalization is clearly contrary to international law. In continental Europe, the act of a state,
unlike the state itself, does not generally enjoy any privilege. See Bourel, Arbitrage internation-
al et immunites des etats etrangers, REV. ARB. 119 (1982).
'"Award, para. 85; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1019. One must bear in mind that, simultaneously to the
negotiations with Aminoil, the government completed the agreed takeover of K. O.C. in 1975.
See supra note 25.
'
45Battifol, Note on the arbitration between A GIP and the People's Republic of Congo, REV.
CRIT. DROIT INT'L PRnIVi 105 at 108 (1982). Battifol points out that Prof. Dupuy's restraint in
TOPCO/CALASIATIC is accompanied with a reservation in case of "manifest error."
'AGIP v. People's Republic of Congo, REV. CRIT. DROIT INT'L PRIVE 1982, 92, at 100, para.
76. English transl. in 21 I.L.M. 726, at 734 (1982). This approach is similar to the principles of
administrative law known as "subsidiarity" and "proportionality," in that it requires a definite
relationship between the goal of public interest and the infringement on the private rights.
147Award, para. 104; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1024.
'
4 Id., para. 110, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1026. The decree-law "obtained its justification from a
general policy duly established and substantiated," and it only "additionally enables an end to




In order for a measure in the public interest to be characterized as a
nationalization, such a measure "must apply to the totality of a given sector
of the economy-that is to say, without discrimination, to an assemblage of
undertakings."' 49 The required general character of a nationalization-
which could obviously not be found in the measure enacted in a decree-law
relating to only one company-was found in a series of measures taken by
Kuwait over the years, and of which the decree-law was but one element.
The arbitral tribunal relied on the assumption that 90 percent of the petro-
leum production in Kuwait had already been nationalized, although else-
where in the award it had noted that this had been accomplished by agree-
ment rather than by unilateral action.' Thus, the progressive pursuit of a
nationalization policy took away the discriminatory character which the
decree-law might have had if it had been an isolated measure. 5'
As to the fact that the only other foreign concessionaire still operating in
Kuwait in 1977, the Japanese-owned A.O.C., was not nationalized, the
tribunal found that this situation did not itself constitute discrimination, as
there was no suggestion that Aminoil had been nationalized because of its
American nationality and there were adequate reasons for excepting
A.O.C. at that time.52
VII. Stabilization Clauses
The Aminoil tribunal's recognition of the validity in principle of stabiliza-
tion clauses implies that they may validly limit the right to nationalize. But
the tribunal adopted a narrow construction of the clauses at hand-that they
did not prohibit nationalization.
A. VALIDITY OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES
The validity of the 1948 and 1961 stabilization clauses' could be chal-
'
4 1d., para. 84; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1018.
15 d., para. 85; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1019.
...Id., para. 86.
'Id., para. 87. Cf. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 524, note 3:
discrimination exists when a measure is "aimed at persons of particular racial groups or
nationals of particular states." See also Akinsanya, supra note 142, at 22.
" 
3Article 17 of the 1948 Concession Agreement reads as follows:
"The Shaikh shall not by general or special legislation or by administrative measures or by
any other act whatever annul this Agreement except as provided in Article 11. No alteration
shall be made in the terms of this Agreement by either the Shaikh or the Company except in
the event of the Shaikh and the Company jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the interest of
both parties to make certain alterations, deletions or additions to this Agreement."
Article 7(g) of the 1961 Supplemental Agreement reads in relevant part as follows:
"Save as aforesaid this Agreement shall not be terminated before the expiration of the period
VOL. 18, NO. 2
Symposium/A minoil A ward
lenged neither on the ground of their allegedly "colonial" character,"4 nor
under the Kuwait Constitution,55 nor under an alleged rule of jus cogens
belonging to public international law. As to the content of international law,
the Aminoil tribunal stated that the government's contention "that perma-
nent sovereignty over natural resources has become an imperative rule ofjus
cogens prohibiting states from affording, by contract or by treaty, guaran-
tees of any kind against the exercise of the public authority in regard to all
matters relating to natural riches [... ] lacks all foundation."'56 Furthermore,
the United Nations resolutions on the subject subsequent to Resolution No.
1803(XVII) do not reflect the state of international law so as "to deduce the
existence of a rule of international law prohibiting a state from undertaking
not to proceed to a nationalization during a limited period of time."'57 It is
however precisely in long-term state contracts that the stability is most
required, as they usually involve the largest investments. A balance has to
be struck between the needs for change and for stability. Furthermore, such
a "particularly serious undertaking [... ] would have to be ... within the
regulations governing the conclusion of state contracts."'' 8 This makes it
important for the investor to check that the person or body making the
undertaking has the authority to do so and follows the proper procedure.
B. INTERPRETATION OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES
1. Original Meaning
This question had not been discussed at great length by the parties, as it
seemed obvious on the strength of the Libyan awards that the sweeping
language of these stabilization (with regard to legislation) and intangibility
(with respect to administrative acts) clauses covered the measure at hand.
Consequently, the parties' arguments focused mainly on the questions of
whether the decree-law was valid in spite of a clause prohibiting the measure
so enacted, and of whether the clauses in question had somehow lost their
force.
specified in Article 1 hereof except by surrender as provided in Article 12 or if the Company
shall be in default under the arbitration provisions of Article 18."
"'Award, para. 89; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1020. The stabilization clauses of 1948 were indeed
confirmed in 1961 and 1973, i.e. after Kuwait had recovered full independence in 1961. In any
event, the "colonial" state was the United Kingdom which had no interest in assisting an
American corporation in securing a concession in competition with English oil companies.
155Award, para. 90(1); 21 I.L.M. 976, 1021. The tribunal added that if the constitution,
promulgated in 1962, had prohibited stabilization guarantees, it would have been necessary for
the state, in order to annul those already granted, to so notify the concessionaire. Id.
'
6Award, para. 90(2); 21 I.L.M. 976, 1021.
'
57Emphasis supplied. Id. The subsequent United Nations resolutions are said not to have had
"the same degree of authority" under international law as might be attributed to Resolution
1803.
'Award, para. 95; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1023.
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However, an undertaking not to nationalize must be express, and since
the clauses at hand did not expressly mention nationalization, no such
undertaking was found.59 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice disagreed with this
conclusion."' The tribunal further decided that only measures having a
"confiscatory character" were prohibited by the stabilization clauses, but
not a nationalization devoid of such a confiscatory character. As a measure
of nationalization is accompanied, as a matter of international law, by a right
to appropriate compensation, such a measure was not covered by the clauses
in question.161 Sir G. Fitzmaurice again disagreed, finding that the stabiliza-
tion clauses were concerned with a termination of the concession by "special
legislation or by administrative measures or by any other act whatever," and
not at all with confiscation;' 62 as a result, he concluded that "the nationaliza-
tion [...] was irreconcilable with the stabilization clauses.' ' 63
In support of its interpretation, the tribunal referred to the fundamental
principle "that the interpretation to be adopted must be such as will give
each clause a worthwhile meaning or object,"'" and to "what the parties had
in mind" in 1948 and 1961.165 This interpretation is further buttressed by two
factors: the "general language" of the clauses and the "especially long"
concession period."6
The conclusion to be drawn from the award in this respect is that it would
be advisable to expressly provide against "nationalization" and to limit such
prohibition to a period substantially shorter than sixty years. In some cases
an ordinary stabilization clause might not prevent the state from validly
passing a nationalization law. A new distinction between stabilization
clauses and non-nationalization clauses has thus been established.67 But
even the latter type of clause, if it can be negotiated, could lose its meaning.
2. Supervening Change in
Nature of Contract
The tribunal set forth another and more convincing basis for its inter-
pretation that in 1977 the stabilization clauses did not prohibit a nonconfis-
catory takeover."6 The government had argued that an "evolutionary pro-
"19Award, paras. 94-95; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1023.
"6Separate Opinion, para. 23.
'
6 Award, paras. 93-94; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1022.
"6Separate Opinion, para. 24.
1
63Separate Opinion, para. 30.
'6'Award, para. 89; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1020.
"Id., para. 93; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1022. These reasons are not completely convincing, as pointed
out by Sir G. Fitzmaurice. Separate Opinion, para. 25. In addition, the fact that, as the tribunal
recognized, Aminoil greatly valued the preservation of its relationship with Kuwait seems
inconsistent with the tribunal's interpretation.
" Award, para. 95; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1023.
'
67Kahn, supra note 1, at 852.
6See Separate Opinion of Sir G. Fitzmaurice, para.'21, 21 I.L.M. 1043, 1050, to the effect
that "this is probably the vital point in the reasoning."
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cess" had led from the classic concession involved in the ARAMCO arbitra-
tion to an "evolved" type of concession, "which has a public character and
which is dynamic, not static."'69 To some extent, the tribunal agreed with the
government. The arbitrators found that "a metamorphosis in the whole
character of the concession" had resulted from "great changes since 1948"
conceded by Aminoil "through the play" of the renegotiation clause or by
"at least tacit acceptances of the company." These changes were induced by
a "profound and general transformation in the terms of oil concessions that
occurred in the Middle-East.""'7 A mining concession in its origin, "[tihe
contract of concession thus changed its character and became one of those
contracts in regard to which, in most legal systems, thestate, while remain-
ing bound to respect the contractual equilibrium, enjoys special advan-
tages."' 7 ' "The faculty of nationalising the Concession could not thencefor-
ward be excluded in relation to the regime of the undertaking as it resulted
from the sum total of the considerations relevant to its functioning.'
' 72
Against the reasoning in the award, Sir G. Fitzmaurice convincingly pointed
out that whatever changes Aminoil agreed to, they were always changes
within the framework of a continuing concession and for the purpose of
maintaining the concession; unilateral termination on the government's
terms is not a change to which any consent on Aminoil's part could be
found .171
The tribunal did not follow the government's more extreme conclusion
that the contract had become a "framework for relationships [... I capable
of changing continuously to meet changing circumstances."'," Rather, the
arbitrators pointed out that the change in the concession was "not a case of a
change involving a departure from a contract, but of a change in the nature
of the contract itself, brought about by time, and the acquiescence and
conduct of the Parties.' ' 75 Thus, the "fundamental principle of pacta sunt
servanda" keeps its "full value.' 76 In other words, the concession had
become a different contract, but it was still a binding contract.
Consequently, the arbitrators did not accept the government's position
that "no damages for lucrum cessans should be awarded. 7 As a result of
their interpretation of the clauses, the latter "reinforce the necessity for
a proper indemnification as a condition of [the termination and nation-
l'"he Government's Memorial, at 3.13-28. See also, the Government's Reply, at 2.63 (the
"evolutionary nature" of the concession).
"7Award, para. 97; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1023.
7
'Id., para. 98.
"Award, para. 100; 21 I.L.M. 976,1024.
'
73Separate Opinion, para. 28.
"
7 The Government's Memorial, at 3.28.
'
75Award, para. 101; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1024.
'
761d., para. 97; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1023.
"The Government's Counter-Memorial, at 3.74(iv).
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alization]."'' Indeed, Aminoil was granted compensation for its lost legiti-
mate expectations, i.e. some measure of lost profits. 7 1
On the other hand, the arbitrators' interpretation of the clauses did not
make it necessary for them, unlike the sole arbitrators in the three Libyan
arbitrations, to decide whether a nationalization could override a nonna-
tionalization clause. But inferences may be drawn from the solution in the
Aminoil award which seem to provide the beginning of an answer. The
question arises when the state no longer views an earlier contractual com-
mitment as compatible with the public interest. For pacta sunt servanda to
keep its full value, a termination/nationalization would only be justified by
such a fundamental change as would make it appear, with hindsight, that the
commitment made as a whole was incompatible with the genuine public
interest and therefore should not have been made in the first place. It should
not be sufficient that a contractual commitment no longer appears as the
best possible way to foster the public interest, 8° nor that the commitment
becomes very onerous. Pacta sunt servanda requires that the state keeps its
end of the bargain."'
VIII. Measure of Compensation-The
Principle of Appropriate Compensation
According to Resolution No. 1803(XVII) of the United Nations' General
Assembly, a lawful nationalization must be accompanied by "appropriate"
compensation (in order to remain lawful). 2 To ascertain what appropriate
compensation is, the tribunal took into account "all the circumstances
relevant to the particular concrete case,"' 83 and especially three main fac-
tors: the nationalizing state's attitude toward foreign investment, the value
of the assets, and the legitimate expectations of the investor (as evidenced
17 1d., para. 96. The same idea was expressed by R. White in "Expropriation of the Libyan
Oil Concessions-Two Conflicting International Arbitrations," 30 I.C.L.Q., 1, at 12 (1981).
79See infra note 188.
1
"See supra note 146. And the holding in Administration of Posts and Telegraphs of the
Republic of Czechoslovakia v. Radio Corporation of America thus retains all its validity:
"When a public institution enters into an agreement with a private person or a private
company, it must be assumed that the institution has intended by this agreement to benefit its
citizens. But that this expectation sometimes proves to fail in not giving the country as large a
profit as was expected, cannot be considered sufficient reason for releasing that public
institution from its obligations as signatory of said agreement." Award of 1 April 1932, 30
AM. J. INT'L L. 523, 534 (1936).
'Indeed one has to assume that at the time the bargain was made, it was presumably the best
that could be bargained for by the state.
'
2Award, para. 143. See Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
Dec. 14, 1982, U.N.G.A., Res. 1803(xvii), 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 17) 15, U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1963), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963).
"'
3Award, para. 144; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1033.
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by the contract and by the investor's conduct). The various compensation
agreements made in the oil industry did not create any relevant customary
rule, as they escape valuation and were induced by "very strong economic
and political constraints excluding any opinio juris"4
A. RELEVANCE OF STATE'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The tribunal's approach implies that there is no single standard of com-
pensation, but that "appropriate compensation" may have different mean-
ings in the context of different relationships between host states and foreign
investors. The fact that the host state favors foreign investment and itself
engages in it requires that appropriate compensation be "calculated on a
basis such as to warrant the upkeep of a flow of investment in the future."'85
The development of the country being the purpose of both investment
contracts and nationalization measures it would indeed be nonsense to
adopt a solution which would jeopardize foreign investment to safeguard
the right to nationalize.
B. VALUE OF ASSETS
In addition to the value of the concession itself, compensation must
include the value of the physical assets, taking into account that Article 13 of
the concession agreement provided that these assets were to belong to the
state "free of cost" at the end of the concession. That value is the "depreci-
ated replacement value," not the "net book value." '186
C. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS OF INVESTOR
187
Both parties relied on that notion, although with different results, and the
tribunal used it to assess the compensation to be paid for the "undertaking
itself, as a source of profit" ,' i.e. as a "going concern.., which must also
take account of the legitimate expectations of the owners." 8 ' These expecta-
"Id., para. 157(i); 21 I.L.M. 976, 1036.
'MId., para. 147; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1033. Kahn correctly points out that the measure of
compensation is thus defined on the basis of a macroeconomic approach to the problem. Supra
note 1, at 862.
1'6Award, para. 165; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1038.
'See Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 A.J.I.L.
553 (1981). The notion of "equitable expectations" has been previously advocated by
KATZAROV, THE THEORY OF NATIONALIZATION, 452 (1964). See also Francioni, Compensation for
Nationalization of Foreign Property: The Borderland Between Law and Equity, 24 I.C.L.Q.
2555 (1975).
'Emphasis supplied. Award, para. 164; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1039.
'9Id., para. 178(1); 21 I.L.M. 976, 1041.
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tions are those relating to the "contractual equilibrium," to be determined
on the basis of the text of the contract, its subsequent amendments and
interpretations, as well as the behavior of the parties. In the case of Aminoil,
the stabilization clauses "dissipate all doubts as to the strength of the respect
due to the contractual equilibrium." 9 Aminoil's legitimate expectations are
evidenced by its attitude at and prior to the beginning of the unsuccessful
Abu Dhabi negotiations in 1976, not by its later proposals before the
takeover in 1977. According to the tribunal, based on the relatively poor
quality of the oil it extracted, Aminoil was aiming, in 1976 and before, at a
reasonable rate of return, not speculative profits. The compensation
awarded included the loss of this return over a period of years, the length of
which is not readily ascertainable from the award. The rate of return was
"assessed on a somewhat more liberal scale" as an element of compensation
than to compute what Aminoil should have been paying during the period
1975-1977.191
One may wonder whether Aminoil would have been better off to agree to
the government's final demands, thus possibly avoiding its takeover in
September 1977. In view of the arbitral tribunal's findings with respect to
informal agreements, tacit consents and acquiescence regarding the 1973-
74 modifications to the concession, an agreement on the government's terms
in 1977 might well have been regarded as valid, and would therefore have
drastically limited Aminoil's recovery in any subsequent arbitration pro-
ceedings. While some of the benefits of a settlement, especially the con-
tinuing relationship with the state, escape evaluation, the arbitration option
might in the present case have been financially more valuable for the
company. This conclusion is at least strongly suggested by a comparison
between the amount of the award and the terms which the government was
willing to accept in 1977. The precise computation of the figure arrived at by
the tribunal of "what constituted the object of the takeover," '92 i.e. the
compensation for both the assets and the lost expectations, are however
difficult to ascertain.
IX. Conclusion
The Aminoil award is an invaluable contribution to the body of principles
governing state contracts. Given this contribution, a foreign investor should
keep the following in mind when entering into such contracts:
'Award, para. 159; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1036.
' ld., para. 168(iii); 21 I.L.M. 976, 1039.
"9Id., para. 178(3); 21 I.L.M. 976, 1041. Compare the French decisions with respect to the
recent nationalizations in France, to the effect that compensation has to correspond to the
market value, and Goldman, Les decisions du Conseil constitutionnel relatives aux nationalisa-
tions et le droit international, 109 J. DROIT INT'L 175 (1982).
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1. the need for a greater awareness of the fact that its counterpart is a
state, which cannot be treated in the same manner as a private party,
since the state is also the "supreme protector of the general interest" 93;
2. the evolution process to which state contracts, especially long-term
investment agreements, may be subjected by the interplay of con-
straints and consent;
3. the specific rules governing the interpretation of investment contracts
in light of their development objective;
4. the confirmation of the right of states to nationalize long-term con-
tracts, absent an express non-nationalization clause;
5. the guaranty of the equilibrium of state contracts through appropriate
compensation, including some lost profits even in the case of a lawful
nationalization;
6. the viability of the arbitration option for the investor in the face of
strong economic pressure; and
7. the advantages of the arbitration option for the state to obtain recogni-
tion of its nationalization program.
"The most correct formulation," Professor Reuter once wrote about state
responsibility for state contracts with aliens, "would be in our opinion, that
of the respect for the contractual equilibrium: to recognize the right of the
state to adapt its undertakings to the necessities of its public services or of its
general policy, but subject to the condition of respecting a certain financial
equation which constitutes the heart of the contractual undertaking.' ' 94
'
93Award, para. 10; 21 I.L.M. 976, 1001.
"9(Translation from French.) DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, at 207-08 (4th ed., 1974).
Professor Reuter was the Chairman of the Aminoil tribunal. See also O'Connell, Critique of the
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